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This article attempts to demonstrate the intimate interconnection 
between value and race in international law. It begins with an 
exploration of Marxist understandings of imperialism, arguing that 
they falsely counterpose race and value. It then attempts to reconstruct 
an account in which the two are understood as mutually constitutive. 
 
 
 
THE HAITIAN INTERVENTION—VALUE, LAW AND RACE? 
 
In his 2008 article ‘Multilateralism as Terror: International Law, Haiti and Imperialism,’1 
China Miéville dissects the 2004 UN intervention in Haiti. In February 2004 President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, leader of the leftwing Fanmi Lavalas movement, was overthrown. 
Boniface Alexandre, Supreme Court Chief Justice, was appointed interim-President, and 
requested international support. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 1529, 
which expressed deep concern for ‘the deterioration of the political, security and 
humanitarian situation’. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
authorised a multi-national ‘peacekeeping force’ which could ‘take all necessary measures’ to 
‘support the constitutional process under way in Haiti’ and ‘maintain public safety and law 
and order and to protect human rights’. Pursuant to the Resolution, the United Nations 
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was created. 
 
For the international legal community, Miéville notes, this intervention was unexceptional. In 
the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Haiti seemed to be a model of good practice: a 
multilateral intervention ‘with the full backing of the UN Security Council’.2 Miéville insists 
that behind this veneer of legality lies a host of problems. In the ‘officially sanctioned story’ 
Aristide was ‘yet another brutal tinpot Dictator’ who had been overthrown by a mass 
movement and voluntarily fled.3 Miéville argues that ‘[t]his is a risible misrepresentation’.4 
Aristide was expelled from Haiti by the US marines and forced into exile. His crime was not 
acting as a dictator, but rather being the central figure in Lavalas, ‘the popular movement that 
. . . represented a significant threat to the power of the (US-supported) Haitian elite’.5 
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For Miéville, the 2004 coup was an attempt by the Haitian elite to topple a popular left-wing 
figure, with the support of the United States, France and Canada.6 This elite included the very 
judiciary endorsed by the UN. On this reading, far from ‘restoring order’, the UN 
intervention legitimised the coup, by providing political and military support for the regime 
established in its wake.7 During the intervention there were thousands of politically-
motivated murders carried out by anti-Lavalas organisations, sheltered by the UN. 
MINUSTAH itself ‘occupied and attacked pro-Lavalas slums . . . in the name of ‘anti-gang’ 
activity . . . leading to arbitrary mass arrests and many civilian deaths’.8 This culminated in 
MINUSTAH’s killing of Emmanuel Dread Wilme, popular Lavalas militant and alleged 
‘gang leader’. 
 
Miéville uses the intervention to illustrate that ‘multilateralism’ is in no way inimical to 
imperialism. In the Haitian case, he argues, powerful imperialist states were able to use 
international law to further their own interests. Miéville holds that the motivation for the coup 
was the fact that the Aristide regime had passed a raft of progressive social legislation, which 
had strengthened the Haitian working class, in particular increasing the minimum wage in 
Haiti’s textile sector, threatening the cheap labour that was the lifeblood of North American 
textile companies. One of the first moves of the post-coup regime was to cut the minimum 
wage.9 In this way, a key function of international law in this instance was to ‘maximize 
profit’ through propagating ‘instability’ and ‘unleashing’ ‘murderous violence’. 10 
 
Miéville’s account is a perfect demonstration of the interconnection between value and 
violence. Since the late 19th century, scholars, militants and activists have sought to make 
sense of this connection through the concept of ‘imperialism’.11 Over the past decade, such 
theorising has made a resurgence in international legal scholarship. It has been self-identified 
critical and radical scholarship which has been at the forefront of the resurgence. Most 
prominent amongst these have been those influenced by the Marxist tradition and those 
influenced by postcolonial scholarship, under the umbrella of Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL). 
 
Miéville’s discussion of Haiti is an exemplary illustration of how Marxists have approached 
the question of imperialism. Marxists have foregrounded the role of value in their accounts of 
imperialism, arguing that imperialism is above all an economic process linked with the 
expansion of capitalist social relations. In the case of Haiti, the intervention served both the 
interests of a particular section of the North American capitalist class—the textile sector—
and ‘more generally underscore[ed] the preferred contemporary dynamics of capital-in-
general towards outsourcing, privatization and the race to the bottom’.12  
 
Whilst Miéville makes a convincing case for the centrality of capitalist accumulation to the 
2004 intervention, there is an obvious absence from his account. Haiti’s population is almost 
entirely black. Those states that Miéville charges with helping to foment the coup—and 
certainly most of their chief representatives—are white. Despite this, within Miéville’s 
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account there are only two references to racism.13 In both cases, he argues that the ‘media’ 
had misrepresented the Haitian situation by mediating its reporting through racist stereotypes. 
This misrepresentation was vitally important in legitimating the intervention. This raises a 
question. Was it just the media that reproduced racial stereotypes? How was international law 
involved here? 
 
Miéville notes that the international legal community was largely silent on the intervention; 
despite the fact that an issue ‘informed by bread-and-butter international law problematics 
such as intervention, sovereignty, the UN and multilateralism . . . should obviously be of 
central interest’.14 Miéville contends that such a silence is due to the fact that the intervention 
was a ‘rebuke’ to the international lawyers’ commitment to multilateralism. There is 
something to this. However, this fails to account for why the ‘factual’ story about Aristide 
has been so readily accepted. Here, the ‘racist reporting’ alluded to by Miéville seems key. 
By reproducing racialised stereotypes about the propensity towards violence of black 
Haitians, the violence of the intervention was able to be hidden.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, one of the key manoeuvres of MINUSTAH was to cast political 
Lavalas activists as ‘gang members’ and ‘armed bandits’. On this basis, UN attacks on these 
activists could be justified in the name of repressing criminal activity.15 The attempt to cast 
political activism or resistance as ‘gang activity’ or ‘terrorism’ is a classic racialised trope.16 
As Antony Anghie and Makau wa Mutua have noted, the law on the use of force constitutes 
certain people as legitimate targets for military intervention by casting them in roles—the 
‘savage’ or the ‘uncivilised’—which draw upon and reinforce established, racialised tropes 
about non-Europeans.17 
 
Race constitutes a remarkable absence from Miéville’s analysis, therefore. This article argues 
that Miéville’s analysis is symptomatic of a wider trend within Marxist international legal 
scholarship. These scholars have tended to present their accounts of imperialism—as a 
process driven by the expansion of capitalist value—as opposed to work in the postcolonial 
tradition that emphasises racial and cultural factors. Consequently, the two most prominent 
radical strands in thinking about imperialism in international law frequently talk past each 
other.  
 
This article contests this opposition, through exploring the Marxist tradition itself. It begins 
by exploring how the Marxist tradition has understood imperialism. It argues that 
contemporary Marxist accounts have erected an overly rigid division between value and race. 
It then questions this division, demonstrating that the tradition of Third World Marxism, as 
represented by Frantz Fanon, provides a ‘stretched Marxist’ alternative in which race and 
value are seen as co-constitutive. Finally, the article returns to Haiti, deploying this 
framework to illustrate how race and accumulation came together to ultimately produce the 
2004 intervention.  
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IMPERIALISM AND VALUE 
 
The starting point for Marxist accounts of imperialism is Marx’s political economic writings. 
Although these writings never directly addressed imperialism, they provided a description of 
the dynamics of capitalist value which have undergirded explanations of its expansion. The 
most obvious way in which Marx discussed these matters were his writings on ‘primitive 
accumulation’.18 Primitive accumulation described the process through which capitalism’s 
preconditions were established. For Marx this was a twofold process, involving the ‘historical 
origins of . . . wage labor, as well as . . . the accumulation of the necessary assets in the hands 
of the capitalist class to employ them’.19 The former case concerned the enclosure of 
common land, which deprived feudal peasants of any way of surviving outside of wage 
labour.  
 
In the latter case, Marx was concerned with how capitalists gained sufficient material wealth 
to begin production. Here capitalists were forced to plunder resources from all over the globe. 
Thus, the dawn of capitalist production was marked by the ‘discovery of gold and silver in 
America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population 
of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of 
Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.20 Equally, ‘the colonies 
provided a market for the budding manufactures’ and ‘the treasures captured outside Europe 
flowed back to the mother country’.21 
 
In this way, early European expansion was driven by the imperative to obtain reserves of 
resources. However, such expansion did not involve fundamentally transforming those non-
European territories. The impetus for social transformation was instead to be found in the 
logic of mature capitalism. In order to compete with their rivals, Marx argued, individual 
capitalists would constantly have to invest in productive technologies, and then undercut their 
rivals on price. But this meant that in order to secure the same profit levels, capitalists would 
need to constantly increase production.22 As a result, ‘the need of a constantly expanding 
market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe’ creating a 
world market in the process.23 
  
Marx’s reflections on the world market, however, suggest a situation in which capitalism 
‘diffuses’ evenly out from Europe.24 This could not fully account for the uneven distribution 
of wealth between different countries, or the scramble for colonial territory. Writing in the 
period leading up to the First World War, and in the shadow of the ‘Scramble for Africa’, a 
number of Marxist theorists of imperialism—amongst them Nikolai Bukharin, Rudolf 
Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg—sought to understand this new terrain. 
They argued that as capitalism matured it became increasingly prone to crisis. In particular, it 
was subject to falling profit rates,25 the production of too much capital to be invested 
                                                 
18 K Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (Penguin, 1990) 873-943. 
19 D Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, vol. 1 (Verso Books, 2010) 291. 
20 Marx (1990) 915. 
21 Ibid 918. 
22 Ibid 436. 
23 K Marx & F Engels, ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’, in R Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader (WW 
Norton & Company, 1978) 469, 476. 
24 JM Blaut, Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (Guilford Press, 1993) 8-26. 
25 K Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3 (Penguin Classics, 1993) 317-78. 
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domestically (overaccumulation),26 and a lack of effective demand for its products owing to 
the impoverishment of the domestic working class.27  
 
All of these tendencies added impetus for capitalists to expand beyond their own national 
borders. Since less advanced capitalist countries have lower levels of labour productivity, 
investing capital abroad, either in the form of loans or in the form of directly building up 
businesses, generates higher profit rates.28 Labour in less advanced capitalist countries can 
also be exploited at higher rates and be subject to greater discipline or coercion.29 On this 
basis, mature capitalism was no longer simply premised on the export of commodities to the 
world market, but the export of capital.30 This export of capital also required the export of 
capitalism. In order to expand, foreign labour would need to be ‘freed’ by breaking up pre-
capitalist social relations. Moreover, given the relative permanence of invested capital, these 
investments required ‘protection’, in the form of direct colonisation, or through other forms 
of control.31 All of this required the coercive power of the capitalist state.  
 
For the ‘classical’ theorists of imperialism, then, capitalism’s endless drive to expand 
required that pre-capitalist societies be forced to submit to its logic. At the same time, the 
wealth that was realised in these territories was only reinvested to facilitate greater profits, 
with the bulk of the profits flowing back to Europe. For Bukharin and Lenin, this created an 
‘international division of labour’ characterised by ‘a few consolidated, organised economic 
bodies (“the great civilised powers”) . . . and a periphery of undeveloped countries with a 
semi-agrarian or agrarian system’.32 Even after capitalist social relations were fully implanted 
into this ‘periphery of undeveloped countries,’ the advanced powers intervened to maintain 
the conditions of profitability.  
 
These theorists emphasised both the territorial nature of imperialism and the struggle between 
capitalist states for these territories. At the close of the Second World War, and with the wave 
of decolonisation, these emphases gave way. In the mid-to-late twentieth century, Marxists 
began to focus more closely upon the effect that imperialism had on the dominated territories 
themselves. Under the rubric of ‘neo-colonialism’33 these Marxists argued that the 
international division of labour had systematically underdeveloped the global periphery.34 
This was so both in terms of its legacy—because European powers had focused on narrow 
extractive industries35—and because the structure of the world economy continued to transfer 
value away from peripheral states.36 Contemporary imperialism is thus characterised 
primarily through forms of economic dependence, with political and military interventions 
                                                 
26 R Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (Routledge, 2003) 11. 
27 A Shaikh, ‘An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories’, in Union For Radical Political Economics (ed.) 
U.S. Capitalism in Crisis (Economics Education Project of the Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978) 
219. 
28 VI Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline (Foreign Languages Press, 1970) 
97; NI Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (Merlin Press, 1972) 98-100. 
29 Luxemburg (2003) 343-46. 
30 Lenin (1972) 73-76. 
31 Ibid 101.  
32 Bukharin (1972) 74. 
33 K Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (Panaf, 1971). 
34 S Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (Monthly 
Review Press, 1976); P Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (Monthly Review Press, 1962); W Rodney, 
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Howard University Press, 1982). 
35 F Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1963), 148-56. 
36 S Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development (Monthly Review Press, 1977) 108. 
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focused on combating threats to the imperialist system and creating the conditions for 
continued profitability.  
 
In the Marxist tradition, then, one can find a very specific understanding of imperialism, 
rooted in the nature of value under capitalism. The logic of competition compels capitalists to 
constantly expand. However, this soon comes up against a number of ‘limits’. Imperialism is 
the attempt to come to terms with these limits, operating as, what David Harvey calls, a 
‘spatial fix’ to the contradictions of capitalist accumulation.37 Imperialism is thus a ‘historical 
solution worked out at the “political” level in response to the fundamental contradictions of 
the corresponding globally dominant mode of production’.38  
 
 
IMPERIALISM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Although there are references to international law in the major Marxist texts on imperialism, 
they tend to be relatively slim, with law seen as a kind of adjunct to the inevitable unfolding 
of an economic logic.39 Nonetheless, this understanding of imperialism has been central to 
the attempts of Marxist jurists to systematically analyse international law. Of these jurists, the 
most famous and influential has been Evgeny Pashukanis. Pashukanis attempted to put 
forward a ‘general theory’ of law, concerned with the ‘basic . . . most abstract juridic 
concepts’ which would be ‘equally applicable to any branch of law’.40 Pashukanis argued that 
it was only possible to distinguish law from rules in general if law was understood as a 
specific social relationship. This firstly required demarcating the specific features of the legal 
form, and secondly analysing the historical and material conditions under which this form 
came about.41 Pashukanis located these conditions within the phenomenon of commodity 
exchange. In every exchange of commodities, each owner must recognise the other as a 
mutual proprietor with an equal right to ownership.42 When disputes arise within commodity 
exchanges they must be regulated and resolved, but such regulation has to recognise and 
uphold the formal, abstract equality of the individuals involved. This is law: a form of social 
regulation between abstract, formally equal subjects.43  
 
Thus, for Pashukanis, there is a structural link between law and capitalism. Prior to capitalism 
commodity exchange did exist, but it was scattered. Correspondingly, law existed at the 
margins of social life, intertwined with other forms of regulation.44 It was only with the rise 
and spread of capitalism that law assumed a central role in society. However, Pashukanis did 
not simply state that ‘more exchange’ leads to ‘more law’. Capitalism is not simply an 
‘exchange society’ but rather one built upon the exploitation of labour power. Under 
capitalism proper, everyone becomes a commodity owner because even members of the 
working class own their labour power.  
 
                                                 
37 D Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Verso, 1999) 413-39. 
38 A Rasulov, ‘Writing About Empire: Remarks on the Logic of a Discourse’ 23 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 23 (2010) 449, 469. 
39 VI Lenin, ‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism’, in MS Levin (ed.), V.I. Lenin, Collected 
Works, vol. 23 (Progress Publishers, 1964) 28, 48. 
40 EB Pashukanis, ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism’, in P Beirne & R Sharlet (eds), Pashukanis, 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (Academic Press, 1980) 37, 39. 
41 Ibid 58. 
42 Marx (1990) 178. 
43 Pashukanis, ‘General Theory’ (1980) 67. 
44 Ibid 80-81. 
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With ‘the full development of bourgeois relations’, value becomes increasingly abstract and 
less concentrated in specific activities. In particular, labour becomes associated with ‘socially 
useful labour in general’.45 In this development, exchange value becomes ‘the embodiment of 
social production relationships which stand above the individual’.46 This increasing 
abstraction sets the material conditions for the fully-fledged emergence of the legal form. The 
legal subject emerges as an entirely abstract category, divorced from particular legal rights, 
enabling ‘man to be transformed from a zoological being into an abstract and impersonal 
subject of law, into a juridic person’.47 This legal subject is ‘the abstract commodity owner 
elevated to the heavens’.48  
 
The formal, abstract equality that Pashukanis ascribed to the legal form very closely 
resembles one of the key elements of international law: ‘sovereignty’. Pashukanis argued that 
‘sovereign states co-exist and are counterposed to one another in exactly the same way as are 
individual property owners with equal rights’,49 since the territory of a state is functionally its 
private property and states engage directly in exchange.50 Since capitalism was only 
generalised through imperialism, international law is also intimately connected with 
imperialism. Following Lenin, Pashukanis argued it was necessary to understand 
international law as ‘the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves 
for domination over the rest of the world’.51 Imperialist states are able to act through 
international law, using it to articulate their interests, with international law serving to 
‘concretize’ economic and political relationships.52 
 
In this way, international law both expresses inter-imperialist rivalries and enables advanced 
capitalist states to dominate the global periphery. Pashukanis noted that the strictures applied 
to protect ‘bourgeois property’ in Europe did not apply to colonial wars, where local 
populations were liquidated ‘without regard for age and sex’.53 The class structure of 
international law was thus revealed in the concept of ‘civilisation’, which allowed imperialist 
states to relate with each other, whilst the rest of the world was ‘considered as a simple object 
of their completed transactions’.54 
 
For Pashukanis, this imperialism was wholly compatible with formal legal equality, since ‘in 
principle . . . states have equal rights . . . in reality they are unequal in their significance and 
their power’.55 It is this insight that Miéville has used to explore the relationship between 
imperialism and international law. Miéville argues that violence and commodity exchange are 
intrinsically interlinked, since private ownership necessarily ‘implies the exclusion of 
others’.56 One can only ‘own’ something insofar as one is able to stop others from taking it, 
or seek redress if they do. Logically, therefore, coercion is implied ‘in the very nature of 
                                                 
45 Ibid 81. 
46 Ibid 77. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid 81. 
49 EB Pashukanis, ‘International Law’, in Beirne & Sharlet (eds) (1980) 168, 176. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid 169. 
52 Ibid 181. 
53 Ibid 172. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid 178. 
56 C Miéville, ‘The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: An Introduction’ 17 Leiden Journal of 
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commodity exchange and production’.57 This coercion is law, since the violence that secures 
ownership is simultaneously the vindication of legal rights.58 Domestically, this violence is 
frequently, although not exclusively, exercised by the state. However, at the level of 
international law ‘[t]here is no state to act as final arbiter of competing claims’ and as a result 
‘[t]he means of violence remains in the hands of the very parties disagreeing over the 
interpretation of law’.59 In the uneven system of imperialism, powerful imperialist states are 
able to resolve legal disputes to their advantage.60 Thus, for Miéville, ‘without imperialism 
there could be no international law’, since it provides the violence that makes international 
law a reality.61  
 
According to the commodity-form theory, therefore, there are deep structural connections 
between international law and value. On the ‘ontological level’, the international legal form is 
systematically generated by commodity exchange. Owing to this close connection, the 
content of international law is provided by the social relations of imperialism. Although the 
precise explanation of the commodity-form theory is not shared by all Marxist theorists of 
international law, they have built upon its basic insights.  
 
BS Chimni holds that ‘law and legal relations are reflective of the social relations which 
constitute a particular society’.62 For Chimni, the international division of labour means that 
certain states and classes possess different levels of social power.63 Dominant states and 
classes are able to pursue their interests through international law and international 
institutions.64 As a result, Chimni argues, international law is ‘a system of principles and 
norms arrived at primarily between states, and secondarily through a network of non-state 
entities, embodying particular class interests’.65 These dominant class and state forces are 
able to use international law to pursue their projects of capitalist accumulation.66  
 
Marxists have also understood international law as an ideological accompaniment to 
imperialism. Susan Marks, in particular, has argued that international law serves as ideology 
insofar as it establishes and sustains relations of domination.67 She argues, for example, that 
‘democracy promotion’ in international law acts as a form intervention into peripheral 
societies, designed to influence their behaviour and to contain any popular radicalism 
associated with social breakdown. The ‘low intensity democracy’ promoted by international 
law ‘forestalls far-reaching structural change in peripheral and semi-peripheral regions’ and 
                                                 
57 C Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Brill, 2005) 127. 
58 S Marks, ‘International Judicial Activism and the Commodity-Form Theory of International Law’ 18 
European Journal of International Law (2007) 199, 204. 
59 Miéville (2005) 292. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 293. 
62 BS Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (Sage 
Publications, 1993) 218. 
63 BS Chimni, ‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law’ 17 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2004) 1, 5. 
64 BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ 8 International Community Law 
Review (2006) 3, 26. 
65 BS Chimni, ‘Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law’ 21 European Journal of International 
Law (2010) 57, 74. 
66 As a Marxist Chimni believes that the class struggle is the driving factor, and that oppressed classes can also 
win legal victories. Ibid 77. He also stresses that capitalist accumulation is not the only factor in the 
determination of international law, which would ‘represent crude economic determinism’. Chimni (2004) 7.  
67 S Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 
(Oxford UP, 2003) 10. 
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so protects ‘relatively low wage, low profit, less monopolized economic activities’ as well 
‘expanding the reach of global markets and eliminating the remaining barriers to the 
transnationalization of capital’.68  
 
Although there are a number of different possible ideological manoeuvres, contemporary 
theorists of ideology have stressed the role that international law plays in separating the 
effects of imperialism from imperialism itself. Tor Krever has analysed how international 
criminal law ‘abstracts individuals from a concrete context’ and so ‘portray[s] the incidents at 
its centre as resulting from “rotten apples” and their bad behaviour’.69 Susan Marks has 
argued similarly in respect of the discourse of human rights. The effect of this is to divorce 
poverty and violence from imperialism’s logic, treating them instead as aberrations, which 
are pathological to capitalism’s normal function.70 International law’s silence about ‘systemic 
logics’ is thus a ‘silence about capitalism’.71  
 
 
FROM PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION TO NEO-COLONIALISM  
 
For contemporary Marxist scholars, then, international law serves as an ideological and 
structural field through which the social relations of imperialism are articulated.72 As such, 
they have mapped international legal transformations onto capitalism’s changing 
configurations.  
 
As Chimni notes, the origin of international law ‘is inextricably bound up with 
colonialism’.73 The ‘discovery’ of gold in the Americas in the late-1400s provided the 
backdrop for the first articulation of a specifically ‘international’ law.74 At the time, the 
European legal order was a feudal one, based on the respublica Christiana, with individual 
monarchs deriving their power from the Pope.75 In 1493, Pope Alexander VI passed two 
Papal Bulls, granting the Spanish monarchy exclusive jurisdiction over the West Indies.76 
Feudal law was structured around the idea that ‘various polities were defined either as 
enemies or members of [the] respublica [Christiana]’.77 Yet these categories did not self-
evidently apply to the natives. Thus, although the Spanish were given control over the West 
Indies, it was uncertain what relationship they would have with the native populations, 
triggering a debate amongst Spanish jurists.  
 
The crucial figure in this regard was Vitoria.78 Vitoria argued that, rather than the divine law 
of the Pope, it was human law which would govern who owned the New World. For Vitoria, 
this human law was represented by the ‘law of nations’ (jus gentium), the rules of which were 
                                                 
68 Ibid 57. 
69 T Krever, ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’ 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 
701, 721. 
70 S Marks, ‘Exploitation as an International Legal Concept’, in S Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left: 
Re-Examining Marxist Legacies (Cambridge UP, 2008) 281, 300. 
71 Ibid 302. 
72 A Rasulov, ‘The Nameless Rapture of the Struggle: Towards a Marxist Class-Theoretic Approach to 
International Law’ 19 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2008) 243. 
73 Chimni (2004) 7. 
74 Miéville (2005) 178. 
75 Ibid 173. 
76 D Castro, Another Face of Empire: Bartolome De Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical 
Imperialism (Duke University Press, 2007) 23. 
77 Miéville (2005) 173. 
78 Ibid. 
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ascertained by human reason. Crucially, Vitoria classed the natives as possessing reason, 
meaning that they could not be arbitrarily deprived of their property.79 However, the natives 
were also governed by this jus gentium, the contents of which included the right to trade and 
the right to evangelise. Any prevention of this right could be met with violent force, which 
would represent a ‘just war’.  
 
Miéville argues that Vitoria’s argument was determined by Spain’s colonial strategy, which 
‘revolved around the brutal extraction of goods and bullion from America’.80 Accordingly, as 
Neocleous states, ‘the question of just war, is shot through with the categories of the war 
on the commons and the language of enclosures’.81 The early elaboration of 
international law was thus driven by the process of primitive accumulation, which 
involved simple ‘colonial plunder’ without any fundamental transformation of native 
societies.82 Consequently, as Chimni has noted, ‘the nature of international economic 
relations in the period . . . did not require a doctrine of inequality of states to be posited,’83 
international law simply had to legitimate extraction.  
 
In the mid-1600s the rise of maritime-mercantile forces—specifically the Dutch and the 
English—led to a new configuration in the world economy.84 This mercantilist system was 
organised around two key legal innovations: Maritime protectionism and East India 
Companies. In the former case, European mercantilist states established trade monopolies in 
their colonies.85 These monopolies were not coupled with formal assertions of control over 
the colonies. Both the English and the Dutch mediated their rule through ‘East India 
Companies’. These were state-monopoly companies, imbued with a degree of international 
legal personality.86 For Miéville, this configuration of European capitalism simply ‘did not 
necessitate a set of complex international legal structures’.87 Although capitalist processes 
had advanced within England and Holland, on the international level they were still organised 
around trade and extraction: asserting control would represent an unnecessary burden.  
 
However, all this changed with Britain’s industrial revolution in the 1760s which ‘rendered 
the mercantile system . . . anomalous, and underlined the need for large colonial monopoly 
markets’ to absorb the ‘flood of products pouring out of the new factories’.88 The colonies, 
previously the source of simple tribute, needed to be transformed into markets for industrial 
manufacture, meaning that Britain needed to take greater control of its colonies.89 Chimni 
argues that this need for social transformation created a necessity for the legal transformation 
of colonies into ‘objects’.90 
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These developments deepened in the mid-1800s, with the birth of imperialism proper. The 
scramble for colonies occasioned by European capitalist development created a new set of 
legal problems. For Miéville, this period was initially one of ‘ad-hoc legality’.91 European 
capitalist states used various legal instruments to acquire footholds in the non-European 
world. They made treaties with tribal chiefs, established protectorates, and concluded unequal 
treaties with those they could not subjugate by force. The ad-hoc nature of these 
developments put them at odds with natural law theory. Miéville argues that the legal 
positivists—who stressed state practice as the source of international law—provided ‘the 
tools necessary’ to legitimate this ad-hoc practice.92 
  
By emphasising the centrality of state will, the international legal positivists—James 
Lorimer, MF Lindley, Henry Wheaton and John Westlake—facilitated the new expansion of 
European capitalism. However, their solution also raised a dilemma. Insofar as European 
states concluded legal agreements with non-European societies, they appeared to endorse the 
idea that non-European societies possessed legal personality. This clashed with the need to 
subordinate and transform these societies. Accordingly, the chief theoretical dilemma of 
international legal positivism was ‘how to engage in international intercourse without 
spreading the bacillus of sovereignty’.93 To do this, they engaged in the language of 
‘civilisation’.94  
 
In the positivist schema, international law was generated by and governed ‘civilised’ 
societies, who formed a Family of Nations. Only insofar as a territory adopted European-
inflected social norms could it become a member of the Family of Nations and so be entitled 
to the protection of international law.95 This operated as a continuum: ‘semi-civilised’ 
societies would be able to engage in limited legal contact, without being fully protected by 
the law, and ‘barbarous’ or ‘uncivilised’ societies would have no legal personality at all. 
Miéville argues that while these doctrines did not ‘finally answer the question of what legal 
capacity’ flowed from imperial treaties, they did ‘formalise . . . ad-hoc responses to the 
question’.96 This, for Miéville, was precisely what they were designed for, to legitimate the 
particular practices of capitalist expansion.  
 
The logic of this categorisation was such that many non-European societies ‘voluntarily’ 
sought to conform to the standard of civilisation. The Ottoman Empire, Japan and Siam were 
able to gain admission into the ‘Family of Nations’. In order to do this, they had ‘to guarantee 
basic rights—relating to dignity, property, freedom of travel, commerce and religion’. These 
rights all facilitated the movement of European capital.97 Chimni thus reads the doctrine of 
civilisation as crucially linked to the consolidation of imperialist capitalism. It was able to 
‘accommodate the rise of non-European great powers’ and force them to adopt capitalist 
social relations as well as providing ‘the ideological justification for declaring the barbarous 
and semi-civilised colonial world outside the pale of operation of the law of nations’.98  
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Of course, such a situation did not last. The anti-colonial movement, backed by the USSR, 
was able to turn international law against colonialism,99 with the UN General Assembly 
declaring colonialism contrary to the Charter. However, for Marxists, imperialism is not 
exhausted by formal colonialism. Instead, ‘[f]aced with the collapse of the colonial system, 
monopoly capital devised new means to subordinate the economies of newly independent 
states’.100  
 
Miéville argues that these 20th century developments were anticipated by the US treatment of 
Latin America. He notes that the US did not oppose the independent states that emerged from 
the Liberation Wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. Rather, in 1823 Secretary of State James 
Monroe adopted the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, which stated that the US would attempt to exclude 
European influence in the region. This was not coupled with an assertion of juridical control. 
Instead the US pioneered an ‘imperialism of recognition’—it would only recognise those 
states with ‘democratic’ constitutions.101 At the same time, the US was able to use its 
considerable economic and political power to influence policies of the countries in its 
‘backyard’. This was coupled with military interventions into recalcitrant states. In this way, 
Miéville argues, Latin America represented a kind of laboratory which set the scene for post-
colonial imperialism.102 
 
Marxists scholars have identified three key axes through which international law has 
continued to mediate the expansion of capitalist accumulation in the face of colonial 
independence. The first of these is international economic law. Chimni maintains that since 
the 1980s, capitalism has witnessed the birth of a ‘global imperialism’. What is distinctive 
about this new configuration is that it is driven by the interests of an emergent transnational 
capitalist class composed of the owners and managers of transnational corporations and 
financial institutions, whose productive and investment activities take place across national 
borders.103 He argues that this class aims to create ‘a global economic space in which uniform 
global standards and norms are to be implemented by all states’ so as to facilitate the global 
accumulation of capital.104 This transnational capitalist class has brought together a network 
of international institutions which constitute a ‘nascent global state’.105 
 
The chief institutions responsible for implementing this programme are the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO. A number of Marxist scholars, both within and without the international 
legal discipline, have drawn attention to the key role that the IMF and World Bank played in 
spreading neoliberal economic policies throughout the Global South through the use of 
conditionalities.106 In this model, debt-stricken countries in the Global South receive financial 
aid on condition that they reform their economies and open themselves up to global capital. 
As Krever has demonstrated, this also operates at a more subtle level, with the World Bank’s 
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‘legal reform’ and ‘good governance’ packages reproducing neoliberal ideology.107 The 
WTO, with its emphasis on breaking down ‘barriers’ to trade and the creation of a global 
intellectual property rights regime, has also been crucial in this process.108  
 
The second axis for modern imperialism has been military intervention.109 As detailed above, 
Miéville has demonstrated the connection between military interventions and capital 
accumulation. Similarly, Neocleous reads the 2003 Iraq war as fundamentally structured 
around questions of primitive accumulation. He notes that immediately after the invasion a 
new Constitution was passed which committed Iraq to a programme of privatisation.110 
Chimni has argued that contemporary military interventions have been mounted to quell the 
possibility of any challenge’ to the interests of powerful states.111 He argues that 
humanitarian intervention and the war on terror in particular have served the role of 
legitimising interventions of the ‘Western power bloc’ (acting in the interests of the 
transnational capitalist class) ‘against third world states’.112  
 
Humanitarianism has not simply undergirded military intervention, it has also served as a 
powerful axis for imperialism in its own right. As Susan Marks has demonstrated, the 
language of human rights has enabled a series of non-military interventions within peripheral 
societies to transform them in ways more amenable to capitalist accumulation.113 This 
process has been accelerated by the development of international criminal law, which has 
‘operated to reproduce one-sided narratives of complex conflicts, demonizing some 
perpetrators as hostis humani generis, while legitimating military interventions in the name of 
humanity’.114 The language of humanitarianism has also proved a powerful tool in co-opting 
and recasting resistance to imperialism in a language which effaces its root causes.115 
 
 
VALUE VS. RACE? 
 
The above sketch was necessarily brief, missing out on much of the fine texture of Marxist 
historical descriptions, as well as some important historical periods. However, what it 
demonstrates is how contemporary Marxist scholars have understood the relationship 
between international law and imperialism. Essentially, they have examined different 
international legal arguments through the periodisation of capital’s expansion. As the 
character of this expansion has deepened, so too has international law’s reach. Once again, 
although these accounts demonstrate the importance of capitalist expansion to international 
law, race remains a glaring absence.  
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Yet, throughout the history of imperialism race is very prominent. Most obviously, 
imperialism has largely been characterised by white, European states expanding into and 
subordinating non-white, non-European societies. Although some rising powers are non-
white and non-European, the contemporary division of labour has largely mirrored these 
historical patterns. These brute facts would seem to merit some mention in any account of 
imperialism. 
 
These brute facts have also had distinct international legal implications. As the rest of this 
article will argue, many of the key moments described by Marxists as driven by capitalist 
expansion were also steeped in racism. Spain’s initial conquest of the Indies were premised—
in part—upon the intrinsic superiority of Christian civilisation, as were other instances of 
colonial dispossession. All of the major European mercantilist powers (and the US) made 
huge profits through the slave trade and the sale of slave-produced goods, as permitted by 
international law.116 Ideas of racial inferiority clearly also underlay the legal positivists’ 
invocation of civilisation, particularly in their assumption that less-developed European 
polities were evidently civilised, whereas many territorially-bounded African Kingdoms were 
counted as uncivilised.117 These ideas carried through into notions of the duty of European 
states to ‘civilise’ the rest of the world, as embodied in Article 6 of the General Act of the 
Berlin Conference (1885).118 Even the early experiments in limited self-determination—the 
League of Nations Mandates and the UN Trust Territories—continued to embed notions of 
Europe’s civilisational superiority.119  
 
The victories of the anti-colonial movement made such explicit racism impossible. Yet the 
three axes of modern imperialism described above all bear traces of racism. The prime target 
of international financial institutions remains peripheral countries, with these institutions 
drawing on racist stereotypes: branding their targets as ‘lazy’ and ‘corrupt’.120 Military 
interventions reproduce assumptions about the ‘savagery’ of non-European societies and their 
propensity towards violence.121 ‘Humanitarianism’ is frequently racially coded. For example, 
many have remarked that the international criminal court has focused exclusively on African 
countries.122 Whilst Krever and Marks are surely correct to stress that the languages of 
international criminal law and international human rights law displace ‘root causes’ to focus 
on ‘monsters’, we might note that the ability to portray certain individuals as ‘monsters’ often 
relies on racial stereotypes about the propensity of black people towards violence.123  
 
In general, these issues are simply absent from much contemporary Marxist scholarship. In 
those instances where Marxist scholars do mention issues of race or racism, they tend to be 
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understood as counterposed to processes of capitalist accumulation. Grietje Baars, for 
instance, insists that the language of the civilising mission was rhetoric used to ‘cover (up) 
the economic motivations of colonialism’. Instead, she argues, we should speak of a 
‘capitalising mission’.124 ‘Civilisation’ was a re-branding exercise, but the process ‘forever 
remain[ed] truly a “capitalising mission”’.125 Similarly, Neocleous has argued that Anghie’s 
work ‘stars savages and races, but primitive accumulation fails to appear’.126 He goes so far 
as to state that colonial confrontations were not concerned with ‘racial supremacy over “the 
other”’ but ‘with the violent enclosure of lands and resources for capital accumulation’.127 
 
In contemporary Marxist scholarship, therefore, international law is seen as mediating the 
expansion of capitalist economic processes. When issues of race are mentioned they are seen 
as competing with economic explanations. This is most clearly seen in Miéville’s reflections 
on the language of ‘civilisation’. In his ‘counterintuitive materialist analysis’128 Miéville 
argues that the real driving force for the development of the language of civilisation was the 
necessity of trading with the ‘semi-civilising’ powers. For him, civilisation arises in order to 
make sense of this situation, as an ad-hoc rationalisation for the expansion of capitalism. 
Explicitly, he argues that civilisation must not be understood as a ‘discursive strategy for 
“othering”’.129 He specifically bemoans Anghie’s invocation of the importance of ‘the other’ 
for the development of international law as a ‘modern-day banality’.130  
 
In this respect, it is telling that both Miéville and Neocleous invoke Anghie’s work as a foil to 
their own explanations. Anghie is one of the pioneers of TWAIL scholarship, which has 
emphasised issues of race and culture as the driving force behind international law’s 
relationship to imperialism.131 Viewed in this way, race and value are competing 
explanations. Either imperialism is about value, and international law can be understood as 
articulating the requirements of capital accumulation, or imperialism is a cultural process of 
‘othering’, with international law serving to manage ‘cultural difference’. This counterposing 
creates a degree of mutual antipathy between Marxist and TWAIL scholarship.132 
 
Given this, it is fitting that the one figure who, in part, escapes from this problem is B.S. 
Chimni, who self-identifies as both a Marxist and a TWAIL scholar. Chimni argues that 
‘[t]he category of ‘class’ is not to be viewed in opposition to that of gender and race’. Instead 
class is ‘a complex unity which encompasses the gender and race divides,’ which are ‘neither 
simply subsumed under the category of class nor are mere additions to it’.133 He notes that 
insofar as international law is rooted in imperialism, ‘its racial past continues to haunt its 
present’.134 Although such a perspective has not animated all of Chimni’s work, he does offer 
an extremely suggestive way forward. Crucial here is his argument—in respect of gender—
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that ‘in many respects colonialism and patriarchy represented two sides of the same coin’.135 
Here we can find the seeds of an account in which race and value are not opposed 
explanatory accounts, but are conceived of as part of the same process. This was the 
argument of the radical anti-colonial Marxists in the Third World, to whom this article now 
turns. 
 
 
THIRD WORLD MARXISMS 
 
In part, the counterposition between race and value described above reflects an 
inattentiveness to the Marxist tradition itself. The Marxist tradition has a complex 
relationship with the anti-colonial and Third World movements. The Bolsheviks were the 
first political movement to put systematic opposition to imperialism at the heart of their 
political programme. The practical effects of this were important. During the inter-war 
period, the ‘Third International brought emissaries from throughout the colonies, who now 
formed a single, unified front meeting European intellectuals on a formally equal footing’.136 
This was central to the emergence of a ‘full-blown culture of anti-imperialism’.137 This 
alliance continued into the Cold War, with the USSR providing support to the national 
liberation movements.138  
 
At the same time, Marxist analysis became important in the national liberation movements 
themselves. The Chinese and Cuban Revolutions were by Communists or figures sympathetic 
to Communism. The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was strongly sympathetic 
to Marxism, consciously borrowing from the ‘era’s Marxist-Leninist tropes’.139 Similarly, the 
struggle against Portuguese colonialism was led by organisations rooted in the Marxist 
tradition.140 These movements engaged in various forms solidarity, and came together in 
conferences and organisations with the aim of combining anti-colonialism with radical social 
transformation. Theoretically, these movements held to an understanding of imperialism 
rooted in the Marxist tradition. At the same time, however, they were confronted with a very 
different set of problems from metropolitan Marxists. In the words of Aimé Césaire, these 
Third World Marxists wanted ‘Marxism and communism be placed in the service of black 
peoples, and not black peoples in the service of Marxism and communism’, meaning that it 
had to be ‘rethought by us, rethought for us, converted to us’.141  
 
As such, the Third World Marxists had to grapple with several distinct issues. Firstly, they 
were less concerned with the rivalries between imperial powers, than how their actions had 
played out in colonial and post-colonial societies.142 This meant a focus on 
underdevelopment, and the cultural and political transformations that had followed in the 
wake of imperialism. Secondly, given that their underdeveloped societies were not 
traditionally considered as ‘objectively’ ready for revolution, they focused much more closely 
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on ‘the significance of subjective conditions for the creation of a revolutionary situation’.143 
Finally, given the unevenness of capitalist development in the Third World, and the 
continuing existence of the international division of labour, they confronted a system marked 
by ‘racial domination . . . peripheral economies undergoing a volatile but uneven and 
incomplete process of modernization; simultaneous but discrete historical modes of 
production; the persistence of pre-modern practices and archaic social forms, discontinuous 
but coexistent with mechanization, industrialization and urbanization’.144 
 
This situation produced a ‘syncretic Marxism’ that was ‘distinguished from orthodox 
European Marxism by combining its critique of objective material conditions with detailed 
analysis of their subjective effects’.145 In this tradition, questions of race and value were seen 
as mutually intertwined. This syncretic Marxism was present in a number of Marxists hailing 
from the non-European world—Amilcar Cabral, José Carlos Mariátegui, Mao Tse-tung to 
name but a few—but the most systematic and influential of these figures was undoubtedly 
Frantz Fanon.  
 
 
STRETCH-MARX 
 
Fanon’s biography is emblematic of this syncretic Marxism. Fanon was born in Martinique, 
then a colony of France, and was the descendant of African slaves. Participating in the 
Second World War he was shocked by the racial hierarchies of the French military.146 After 
the war he became a psychiatrist, moving to Algeria in 1953 to practise. At the same time, he 
became increasingly involved in radical, anti-colonial politics, and was won over to the 
FLN’s struggle, which he viewed as the vanguard of the anti-colonial movement.147 In Black 
Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth he put forward an understanding of race 
deeply rooted in the logic of capitalist value. In these texts, he insisted that the ‘orthodox 
Marxist’ understanding of the relationship between race and value could not adequately 
capture the reality of colonialism, since: 
 
The originality of the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality, and the 
immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. When 
you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out 
the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a 
given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The 
cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because 
you are rich.148 
 
Some have read this quote as a wholesale repudiation of Marxism.149 However, Fanon 
follows this statement up with another, namely that ‘Marxist analysis should always be 
slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem’.150 The use of the term 
‘slightly stretched’ should alert us that Fanon did not jettison the Marxist framework, but 
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rather read Marxist categories through the experience of the Third World. Fanon did not 
argue that racism ‘explains’ the reality of colonialism or imperialism. In the earlier Black 
Skin, White Masks—usually taken as Fanon’s least Marxist text—he had explicitly disavowed 
such a position, arguing that ‘[t]he Negro problem does not resolve itself into the problem of 
Negroes living among white men but rather of Negroes exploited, enslaved, despised by a 
colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white’.151 
 
In this respect, Fanon held to the classical Marxist notion that imperialism was driven by the 
logic of expanding capitalist value. At the same time, he insisted that this explanation missed 
something vital about colonialism. Fanon’s argument boiled down to the fact that ‘in the 
colonial context’, race served a role in structuring the distribution of the political and 
economic benefits of imperialist exploitation.152 It was by virtue of their race that white 
settlers gained access to the material benefits of colonial capitalism. At the same, time these 
settlers accrued a series of political and ideological benefits. These benefits extended across 
class lines, meaning that traditional Marxist notions of class could not be mechanically 
applied.  
 
Vitally, then, Fanon did not argue that race trumps value, or that race is more important than 
class. He was instead making the more subtle point that under the material conditions of 
imperialism, race will play a crucial role in organising and structuring social existence. What 
would have traditionally been considered by Marxists to be part of the ‘superstructure’ played 
a crucial role in the economic ‘base’. This was a ‘stretching’ of Marxism, because it would 
have to depart from the traditional Marxist schema. But this did not mean abandoning the 
historical materialist method. Instead it was necessary to deploy a materialist analysis of race 
as a social form. This analysis would first have to outline how race is socially produced. It 
would then reflect on the particular set of material conditions that allowed race to exert such a 
determining role in structuring imperialist social formations. 
 
In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon argued that blackness was the result of a series of 
‘aberrations of affect’, rooting the black man153 ‘at the core of a universe from which he must 
be extricated’.154 He traced how colonial relations produced a ‘Manichean’ psychic affect 
where white is ‘good’ and superior and black is ‘bad’ and inferior.155 This Manicheanism was 
not simply felt on the part of the white colonial masters, but was psychologically internalised 
by black, subject peoples. Consequently, black people aimed to ‘become’ white by going to 
the metropolis and learning to be ‘civilised’.156 This created a situation in which black 
individuals became neurotic.157 
 
Crucially, for Fanon, the widespread and systematic nature of this ‘psychoexistential 
complex’ meant that it could not be explained from an individual psychological standpoint.158 
He argued that the ‘inferiority complex’ that he described was the ‘outcome of a double 
process’. This process was primarily an ‘economic’ one, which was then psychologically 
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internalised by colonised populations.159 For Fanon, the fact of blackness was not absolute. 
He noted that as ‘long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in 
minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others’.160 It is only in relation to the 
white man that the black man is able to experience his status as a black man.161 However, the 
mere ‘contact’ with a white man is not enough to induce a sense of inferiority. Instead the 
inferiority comes about because after the ‘white man has come . . . at a certain stage he [the 
black man] has been led to ask whether he is indeed a man’.162 As a black man, one ‘begin[s] 
to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination 
on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am 
a parasite on the world, that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the 
white world’.163 The ‘inferiority complex’ thus arises because the white man comes to the 
colony not as a generic ‘other’ but as master.164  
 
Fanon therefore argued that the Manichean division into black and white arose because the 
Europeans had come to the rest of the world to exploit it economically. Impelled by the 
processes of capitalist accumulation to control colonised populations, they created a series of 
racial justifications for this control. Fanon’s central point was that any country that ‘lives, 
draws its substance from the exploitation of other peoples, makes those people inferior.’165 
This creation of inferiority was necessary for a number of reasons, all closely linked with the 
imperatives of capitalist accumulation. 
 
Any system based on geographically-differentiated exploitation necessarily produces great 
concentrations of wealth in the hands of a minority. The nature of capitalist imperialism 
meant that only a small number of the native bourgeoisie would receive a share in this surplus 
value, with the majority flowing to the ‘mother country’ or to white settlers within the 
colonial territory.166 By ascribing racial inferiority to the natives, it became possible to justify 
dispossessing them of their land, and withholding the benefits of exploitation from them. 
Racialisation was not simply needed to establish and justify European dispossession of non-
Europeans, it was also vital in heralding the material transformations required by the export 
of capital. With the birth of imperialism proper it became necessary to transform 
fundamentally peripheral territories. Natives needed to be forcibly transformed into 
‘labourers’ and capitalist social relations had to be implanted and intensified. This, however, 
came into conflict with the culture of the native inhabitants. Accordingly, the colonial 
situation required ‘the destruction of cultural values’.167 In order to fully carry through such a 
transformation, it was not enough ‘to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a 
dominated country’,168 native culture had to be cast as intrinsically flawed throughout all its 
history.  
 
These social transformations also required that the colonised themselves internalise the 
inferiority of blackness. The racial inferiority complex was promoted in such a way as to 
convince native populations that without European ‘guidance’, they ‘would at once fall back 
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into barbarism, degradation and bestiality’.169 This was especially the case with native 
intellectuals, who were inculcated with European thought and social mores.  
 
Fanon also maintained that race was deployed to manage the antagonisms thrown up by 
colonialism and imperialism. By destroying any sense of a ‘national’ culture, potential 
resistance to the colonial project is deprived of a key weapon.170 Race also enabled colonial 
populations to be stratified and turned against each other, with a racialised hierarchy formed 
which would allow some natives to share in the benefits of imperialist exploitation, in what 
Fanon termed ‘the racial distribution of guilt’.171 This did not just operate at the level of the 
colonised. By structuring how value flowed in the colony (and internationally), racial 
categories were able to create unity amongst metropolitan populations.172 This enabled the 
creation of a cross-class coalition that was united in its support of colonialism.  
 
Ultimately, for Fanon, a ‘colonial country is a racist country’.173 This blunt assertion 
underscored his sophisticated ‘stretched Marxist’ argument, which suggested that under the 
material conditions of imperialism, race would become a central element in the ‘economic 
base’. Processes of racialisation were accordingly present at key moments in the process of 
capital accumulation. Given this close connection between racialisation and the material logic 
of capitalism, Fanon paid detailed attention to how specific racialised forms were thrown up 
by the changing configurations of international capitalism.  
 
Since race is a social relation, Fanon understood that its ‘targets’ were by no means fixed, but 
always varied according to which particular population was subject to exploitation.174 Fanon 
also insisted that changes in regimes of accumulation and techniques of production would 
also give rise to different forms of racialisation. He explained that in the initial period of 
capitalist expansion, involving ‘crude exploitation of man’s arms and legs’ and the mere 
plunder of resources, imperialism gave rise to ‘[v]ulgar racism in its biological form’.175 
However, with the ‘evolution of techniques of production’ racism evolved into ‘more subtle 
forms’.176 Since imperial powers could no longer simply exterminate native populations but 
needed ‘various degrees of approval and support’ and the ‘cooperation’ of the exploited, 
racism assumed a ‘more “cultivated” direction’.177 Finally, aside from these more deep-
rooted transformations, Fanon understood that racialised forms would change in line with 
conjunctural imperatives, particularly when they were challenged by anti-racist and anti-
imperialist resistance.178 
 
The crucial point, then, is that—for Fanon—race and value are not counterposed. Instead, at 
every moment of the process of capital accumulation, race is central. Race initially enters the 
scene to justify the dispossession of native inhabitants and legitimise the transfer of value 
from the periphery. The deep social transformations required for expanded capitalist 
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accumulation are articulated in terms of racial categorisations. Finally, these racialised 
categories play a crucial role in governing peripheral territories and containing resistance of 
processes of capitalist accumulation.  
 
 
FANONIAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 
 
Fanon’s analysis has important implications for how we understand the relationship between 
imperialism and international law. As previously described, those Marxists who subscribe to 
the commodity-form theory argue that there is a homology between the legal and commodity 
forms. Yet if the commodity form is also closely linked with processes of racialisation, we 
would also expect to see a close link between race and the production of legal subjectivity.  
 
As Brenna Bhandar has argued, the emergence of property is intrinsically linked with 
processes of racialisation. Following Pashukanis, Bhandar argues that capitalist property law 
is always centred around abstractions. Unlike pre-capitalist notions of ownership, private 
property is not necessarily based on actual possession or use, but is rather rooted in a 
‘metaphysical’ idea of entitlement.179 This metaphysical idea is dependent on the fact that 
certain people have the capacity or right to own and dispose of property, i.e. they are legal 
subjects.180 Thus, the idea of property as abstract entitlement only comes into being with the 
full development of capitalism. As Pashukanis himself put it, it was ‘[o]nly with the full 
development of bourgeois relationships’ that law was able to ‘obtain an abstract character’.181 
For Pashukanis, this only occurs when ‘bourgeois civilization affirmed its authority over the 
whole globe’.182 Yet the way in which bourgeois civilization affirmed its global authority was 
through a series of racialised categories, which cast the non-capitalist world as racially 
inferior and therefore in need of transformation. As a matter of historical fact, the emergence 
of abstract legal subjectivities was coterminous with the emergence of a series of racialised 
categories.183  
 
Specifically, abstract notions of ownership emerged in the context of two racialised figures. 
The first of these were indigenous peoples, who were conceived of as lacking any notion of 
private property and so were able to be dispossessed of their common-land. The second were 
African slaves who, despite being living human beings, were nonetheless transformed into 
property because of their race. In this way, Bhandar argues, ‘[e]mergent forms of property 
ownership were constituted with racial ontologies of settler and native, master and slave’.184 
These categories were mutually constitutive, insofar as notions of abstract property were 
affirmed through the dispossession of natives and the ownership of slaves. At the same time, 
it was through legal argument that the particular statuses of the native and slave were 
solidified.  
 
Thus, when Pashukanis argued that the legal subject represented ‘the abstract commodity 
owner elevated to the heavens’, he missed a crucial qualification: this abstract commodity 
owner was both white and European. Abstract formal equality obtained between these 
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subjects only. As Fanon noted, the quality of being ‘human’—or in this case being recognised 
as a legal subject—was defined as ‘Western humanity as incarnated in the Western 
bourgeoisie’.185 
 
Consequently, both race and law operate as ‘modes of abstraction’.186 Law abstracts from 
concrete entities and posits them as legal subjects. Race too abstracts individuals and 
societies from their concrete existence and inserts them into hierarchies based on supposed 
‘difference’.187 These two abstractions were intertwined. Racial abstractions played a crucial 
role in determining the distribution of legal benefits and subjectivities, with full legal 
subjectivity available to the white, European subject. At the same time, legal abstractions 
were central in defining and formalising these racial categories.188 It is here that Fanon’s 
insights as to the relationship between racism and capital accumulation become particularly 
important. Fanon identified a number of key ‘moments’ in the accumulation of capital in 
which racialisation played a central role. Each and every one of these moments is also 
juridical.  
 
With this interdependence of law, race and value in mind, it becomes possible to think about 
how Fanon’s stretched Marxism might help us make sense of international law’s relationship 
to imperialism. In Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Anghie 
famously argued that international law was governed by a ‘dynamic of difference’. 
According to Anghie: 
 
International lawyers over the centuries maintained this basic dichotomy between the 
civilized and the uncivilized, even while refining and elaborating their understanding 
of each of these terms. Having established this dichotomy, furthermore, jurists 
continually developed techniques for overcoming it by formulating legal doctrines 
directed towards civilizing the uncivilized world. I use the term ‘dynamic of 
difference’ to denote, broadly, the endless process of creating a gap between two 
cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and 
uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize the 
aberrant society. The dynamic is self-sustaining and indeed, as I shall argue, endless; 
each act of arrival reveals further horizons, each act of bridging further differences 
that international law must seek to overcome.189 
 
Anghie’s own explanation for why this dynamic recurs within international law is somewhat 
contradictory. At times he treats it as an inevitable feature of the discipline, with the 
management of ‘cultural difference’ operating transhistorically.190 At other times though, this 
general pattern was a result of international law being ‘profoundly shaped by . . . [the 
colonial] encounter, encoding within its disciplinary structures . . . the discriminatory features 
of cultural difference’.191 It is the ‘idealism’ of this account that Marxists have tended to react 
against.192 However, from the perspective of stretched Marxism it is possible to maintain 
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Anghie’s insights about the ‘dynamic of difference’, without adopting his particular 
explanatory mechanisms for its recurrence. In other words, it might be possible to formulate a 
materialist ‘dynamic of difference’. 
 
Reading Anghie in this light, one cannot help but notice a similarity between his description 
of the dynamic of difference and Marx’s and Engels’ rhetorical flourishes in the Communist 
Manifesto. There, Marx and Engels wrote that the ‘need for a constantly expanding market 
for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe’ and that it must 
‘nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere’.193 This class, they 
continued, was forced constantly to revolutionise production, leading to ‘uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation’.194 
 
Almost all of the features Anghie ascribes to the dynamic of difference can be understood in 
the light of capital accumulation. The pressures created by capitalist competition mean that 
capitalists must constantly push beyond their boundaries, positing capitalism as the 
‘universal’ model of social organisation which must replace all others. The ‘techniques to 
normalize the aberrant society’ are those which enable capitalists to penetrate and transform 
other social formations. However, the aim of capitalists is not ‘development’, but increased 
profits. Consequently, capitalists make use of ‘non-capitalist’ forms of organisation and 
exploitation. Moreover, colonial and neo-colonial expansion produces uneven economic 
development in a few key sectors and high concentrations of wealth amongst a narrow group 
of people.195 All of this means that the ‘normal’ operation of imperialism in the peripheries 
always produces incomplete, hybrid economic systems characterised by extremely uneven 
development. Because of these low levels of ‘development’, outside intervention is needed to 
‘improve’ them thus revealing ‘further horizons’ for intervention.  
 
This also underscores the endless nature of the ‘dynamic of difference’. One of the key 
lessons of the Marxist tradition is that capitalism necessarily needs endless accumulation. As 
Lenin put it, capitalists are compelled ‘to seize the largest possible amount of land of all 
kinds in all places . . . taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be 
left behind’.196 We might say that the dynamic of difference is ‘as unbounded as the capitalist 
lust for profit’.197 
 
Each element of Anghie’s ‘dynamic of difference’ can therefore be understood as 
underscored by the material foundation of capital accumulation. To be more precise, given 
the close connection between capital accumulation and racialisation, we can read Anghie as 
describing the process of capital accumulation from one particular angle. A Fanonian, or 
stretched Marxist, perspective therefore enables us to read Anghie’s work (and that in the 
TWAIL tradition more generally) and Marxist work in complementary ways. The dynamic of 
difference needs to be historicised and located within capitalist social relations, but we must 
understand those social relations as fundamentally structured by the dynamic of difference. 
International law, therefore, is deeply, indeed structurally, rooted in both capital 
accumulation and racialisation. It mediates and articulates the expansion of capital through 
racialising certain territories and societies. In so doing, it opens them up for the penetration of 
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capital, and facilitates their control and management. As the particular character of capital 
accumulation changes, so too does the form of racialisation, which is constituted through 
international legal categories. Marxist jurists from the Third World have intuitively grasped 
elements of this, locating how international law has inserted peripheral territories into the 
global capitalist order.198 However, none of these figures quite captured the dynamics of 
stretched Marxism, being largely inattentive to the racialised nature of capital accumulation.  
 
 
HAITI, RACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Returning, then, to Miéville’s analysis of Haiti, we can now see how a ‘stretched Marxism’ 
can make better sense of both Haiti’s history and the 2004 intervention. The island now 
known as Haiti was originally inhabited by the Taino people, who named it ‘Ayti’. In 1492 
Columbus landed on the island, naming it Hispaniola. Initially the encounter was shaped by 
Spain’s dealings with the ‘Moors’, the Muslim peoples with whom the Spanish had been at 
war for centuries; a war which had been justified in the name of converting the heathen.199 
The Spanish, as the ‘superior civilisation’, justified their presence because of their duty to 
convert the heathen natives. The acquisition of the Indies was thus justified on racialised 
grounds, namely the inherent superiority of the Spanish. However, it soon became apparent 
that the Indians were not the Moors, leading to the debates described previously. 
 
The Spanish Empire was primarily ‘a land-grabbing exercise chiefly concerned with the 
extraction of tribute and taxes from subject populations’.200 Accordingly, the Spanish 
implemented the encomienda system. In this system the natives were seen as ‘wards’ of the 
Spanish, who were to be civilised. A settler would become a trustee of a group of wards, and 
be entitled to lifetime rights to the product of native labour and tribute.201 In exchange the 
trustee would evangelise the population. In practice, the system was extremely brutal, 
involving forced labour. A number of Spanish ‘humanitarians’ opposed the system, notably 
Bartolomé de las Casas, a Dominican Friar who gained ‘notoriety as an ardent defender of the 
people indigenous to the Western Hemisphere’.202  
 
Las Casas argued that labour conditions were too hard on the natives and verged upon 
slavery, which ran against their legal rights, in place of the encomieda system he proposed 
that the natives be protected by labour regulations. These suggested reforms clashed with the 
objective of Spanish accumulation, which aimed at maximising ‘Indian tribute and mineral 
wealth extracted through the encomieda system’.203 Any slackening of the rate of exploitation 
of the natives would need to be compensated. To remedy this, Las Casas proposed ‘the 
importation of a limited quantity of slaves to recompense the settlers for their Indian labour 
supply’.204 The ‘advantages’ of slavery were twofold: firstly, slaves were naturally more 
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suitable for difficult and menial labour.205 Secondly, since they had been ‘justly’ enslaved, no 
legal problem would arise as to subjecting them to harsh discipline.  
 
Although Las Casas’s proposals were not implemented in full, ‘as a direct result of his 
proposals, the Spanish Crown granted a licence to a Flemish courtier, Gouvenot, which gave 
him permission to import 4000 slaves . . . into the Indies’.206 This presaged future 
developments in the region. Although the associations between slavery and blackness had not 
yet fully solidified, the African coast provided the most ready source of slaves. These slaves 
were particularly ‘efficient’ at the production of sugar, the demand for which within Europe 
was rising. This created an expanding dynamic. African slaves proved effective at sugar 
production, which became more profitable. Accordingly, settlers clamoured to produce more 
sugar, which created a greater demand for slaves, who were primarily to be found in Africa, 
which buttressed the connection between slavery and blackness.207  
 
Las Casas’s arguments represented, however inadvertently, the logical outcome of the 
juridical arguments that played a key role in constituting Spanish accumulation in 
Hispaniola. Given the religious and political complexities of feudal Europe, and the necessity 
for extracting wealth, wholly dispossessing or exterminating the native population was not a 
possibility. As such, the natives were granted some limited legal personality, but subjected to 
regimes of ‘trusteeship’ and governed by a law of nations which universalised Spanish 
practices. As a result, they were partially racialised, whilst retaining limited legal 
subjectivity. However, these legal arguments clashed with the imperatives of Spanish 
accumulation, which demanded harsh labour discipline. Las Casas articulated a legal solution 
to this quandary: protect the natives by supplementing their labour which a group of people 
who were without legal personality, and could therefore be subjected to the harshest forms of 
labour discipline. Although not fully conceived of in racial terms, Las Casas provided the 
basic building blocks for an argument in which accumulation could be guaranteed through a 
racialised hierarchy. 
 
 
Towards Revolution 
 
In the 1620s, the French and British also began to occupy areas of Hispaniola. Under the 
1697 Treaty of Rsywick the Spanish ceded the West of the Island to the French, who named 
it Saint-Domingue. These legal titles were, of course, based upon the idea that Ayti’s native 
inhabitants had no title to the land themselves.  
 
When Las Casas made his initial recommendations, the racial character of slavery had not yet 
fully solidified. Although Africans made up the bulk of slaves, slavery was at that point 
organised along religious lines.208 It was only in the mid-1600s that the association between 
blackness and slavery was fully concretised.209 There are numerous reasons for this, but two 
are pertinent. Firstly, black populations were easier to manage, severed as they were from 
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their homes and social connections.210 Secondly, there was a real fear that the forms of unfree 
labour in which black and white workers commonly engaged in generated unity between 
these populations. In this way, ‘the turn to racial slavery was a response to sharp social 
divisions among settlers and sought to create an ersatz unity among whites, indeed by 
creating “white” itself as a social and legal category’.211  
 
By the late 1600s, slavery had been consolidated firmly through the law. In the French case, 
this was achieved by the 1685 Code Noir, a decree passed by King Louis XIV. Although 
nominally presented as protecting slaves, the Code was crucial in formalising the racial 
character of slavery. As is evident from the name, the Code fully associated slavery with 
‘Negroes’. It also formalised the hereditary nature of slavery (Article XIII) and the slave’s 
status as property by depriving them of the ability to buy or sell goods (Articles XVIII and 
XIX). The Code underscored the inferior legal status of enslaved blacks and—in consequence 
—also defined the privileges of free (white) men. This was matched by a series of Articles 
forbidding ‘carrying any offensive weapons or large sticks’ (Article XV) and preventing 
‘slaves who belong to different masters from gathering’ in large numbers (Article XVI). The 
racialised categories of slavery were thus also used to manage the possibility of slave 
resistance.  
 
Over the 1700s more than 800,000 slaves were imported to Saint-Domingue.212 By 1789, the 
population stood at 450,000 black slaves, 28,000 free blacks and mulattoes and 40,000 white 
settlers. Very rapidly, Saint-Domingue became central to the French economy, it produced a 
huge amount of high quality sugar and coffee for export.213 The comparatively low cost of 
reproducing slave labour, and the intensive nature of the sugar and coffee plantations, meant 
that racialised slavery was key to high profits.214 As such, France’s position in the global 
economy was dependent upon a form of racialised labour discipline, constituted and 
maintained by juridical relations, on both the domestic and international scale.215 The 
argument tentatively advanced by Las Casas was systematised by the French.  
 
There had always been periodic slave uprisings in Saint-Domingue, but in 1791, under the 
shadow of the French Revolution, a revolution began. Black slaves rose up, eventually 
demanding the abolition of racialised slavery.216 Recognising the close connection between 
race and value, the white settlers argued that ‘there can be no agriculture in Saint-Domingue 
without slavery’.217 They sensed that any concession to the uprising could prove fatal to the 
institution of slavery itself, with ‘the slaves who have hitherto remained loyal’ also turning to 
violence to gain the same benefits.218  
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The dynamic of the French Revolution made it increasingly difficult to maintain this attitude. 
The French masses ‘were striking at royalty, tyranny, reaction and oppression of all types, 
and with these they included slavery’.219 With the abolition of the Monarchy and the 
declaration of a Republic, the new National Convention would deliberate under these 
circumstances. The Commissioners dispatched to Haiti had not yet heard of such 
developments, and so continued to advocate for slavery. This led Touissant L’Ouverture, the 
chief figure in the slave revolution, to declare support for the Spanish in their war with the 
French.  
 
Recognising the importance of gaining the support of the black army, in 1793 a General 
Emancipation decree was issued, abolishing slavery in the North. Then, in February 1794, the 
Convention abolished slavery in all of France’s colonies. L’Ouverture and the newly-freed 
slaves went over to the side of the French. Emboldened by this success, in 1801 L’Ouverture 
proclaimed a new constitution—sent to France—abolishing slavery and all racial distinctions. 
At the same time, however, it asserted the ‘French-ness’ of the colony, by, for example, 
making Catholicism the official religion.220  
 
These concessions were not enough, Napoleon had come to power in France, smothering 
much of the emancipatory nature of the Revolution. In particular, he sought to restore slavery 
to France’s colonies, recognising it as a key element of French prosperity and to this end he 
sent an army to Saint-Domingue to restore its colonial status.221 By 1803, the French forces 
were defeated and in January 1804 Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared a new independent state 
of Haiti. 
 
 
Post-revolutionary recognition 
 
The first challenge that the newly-independent Haiti faced was its isolation. As with any new 
state, Haiti could only survive insofar as it made formal legal contacts with other states and 
was recognised by those states as an independent entity. Having just fought a war to prevent 
independence, France was unlikely to recognise Haiti. This was not simply bitterness or 
pride. Although Haiti had been the ‘jewel of the Caribbean’, it was not France’s only colony; 
France had colonies in—inter alia—Grenada Guiana and Martinique, both of which relied on 
racialised slave labour. Following the logic of the planters in Saint-Domingue, the French 
realised that a successful Haiti would become a beacon to those colonies. During ‘the crucial 
first months and years of Haitian independence, French agents attempted to rupture 
established networks of trade’.222 The ultimate aim of this policy was to force the new 
republic back under the ‘protection’ of France and demonstrate the folly of anti-colonial slave 
rebellions.223 
 
During their struggle for independence, the slaves had made tentative contacts with the 
British. The British, who were at war with the French, saw that the loss of Saint-Domingue 
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would be a great blow to their enemies, and so gave limited military aid.224 Thinking this 
might also hold true in the aftermath of independence, some elements of the new Haitian 
government approached Britain. However, the British government did not wish to 
acknowledge fully Haiti’s new status; instead they explored ‘ways that Haiti could remain 
independent from France but not entirely independent of foreign influence and control’.225 
The British attempted to sign a commercial treaty that would have given some limited 
recognition to Haiti, whilst allowing the ‘British Empire to dictate domestic and foreign 
policy’.226 The treaty was refused. By 1807, ‘while the British government happily let their 
merchants trade with Haiti, they refused to recognize Haiti’s independence’.227 There was an 
obvious reason for this: although Britain had abolished the slave trade, it continued to 
maintain slavery in its colonies. Any recognition of Haitian independence would ‘send a 
message to their own population that an antislavery revolt was acceptable’.228  
 
It was for this reason too that the United States refused to recognise Haiti. In theory, the 
United States should have eagerly endorsed Haitian independence. Both were states that had 
thrown off their former colonial masters, and the US and Haiti had a long history of semi-
legal trade during French colonial role.229 However, the US was a slave power. Even more 
than in Britain or France, slave labour was crucial to the US’s global economic position.230 
Moreover, given its status as an immigrant nation, the construction of ‘whiteness’ took on a 
crucial role in the US. Any wholesale recognition of Haiti could threaten both the US’s 
economic position and its political cohesion.  
 
As such, the US was marked by a deep ambivalence towards Haiti. For two years after 
independence there was a booming trade between the US and Haiti. However, in February 
1806, partly under pressure from the French and partly because of Haiti’s status as a black 
republic, the US Congress outlawed trade with Haiti231 (over the objections of numerous US 
merchants, who saw plentiful business opportunities in Haiti232). After the ban was lifted, 
trade increased. By the 1820s, Haiti’s exports to the US were worth $2 million a year, with 
Haiti providing ‘one-third of all the coffee consumed in the United States’.233 Yet recognition 
was still not forthcoming. The US Congress remained worried that recognition would 
ultimately threaten the position of the slave-holding Southern States.234  
 
Race and value were deeply intertwined. On the one hand, the imperative to trade clearly 
motivated advanced capitalist powers to deal with Haiti. At the same time though, there was 
no ‘pure’ sphere of the economy. The major powers’ economic positions were built upon 
regimes of legalised racial hierarchies, as embodied in slavery, but also more generally in 
colonial occupations. To recognise Haiti, and contribute to its success, threatened to turn it 
into an example which might undermine those racial hierarchies, and thus threaten their 
profits. This was mediated through international law: there was a minimal form of contact, 
through trade treaties, but a withholding of full recognition. 
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France eventually acknowledged that isolating Haiti was a lost cause. In 1825, Charles X 
issued a Royal Ordinance, addressed to ‘the French part of Saint-Domingue’ recognising its 
independence. The legal form of this agreement— a Royal Ordinance addressed to a subject 
of France, not a treaty between two nations—was not accidental. Haiti was essentially 
addressed as a wayward colony, which was being granted independence. However, 
recognition came with a catch. Under the first Article of the Ordinance, Haiti was to open 
itself up to trade from all nations, with an equal tariff for all, apart from France, which would 
only pay half the standard rate. The second, most controversial, Article demanded that Haiti 
pay 150 million francs to compensate for the loss of slave property occasioned by the 
revolution.235  
 
In agreeing to compensate for the loss of slave property, the Haitian government necessarily 
recognised both the legality and legitimacy of the racialised slave trade. Here then the 
relationship between race and value—as mediated through the law—had come full circle. 
France was willing to recognise Haiti’s independence, and open it up to processes of further 
capitalist expansion, provided the Haitians accepted the legitimacy of racialised slave 
property  by compensating for its loss. In order to repay the indemnity, Haiti was forced to 
take a loan from a French bank. The ‘terms of the loan were highly disadvantageous: the 
Haitian government required to repay 30 million francs over 25 years at an annual interest 
rate of 6 percent’ with the bank charging an additional twenty percent just for the loan.236  
 
In this way, the racialised debt regime had the perverse effect of further bonding Haiti to its 
former colonial master. Haiti was placed in a position of profound weakness in the global 
economic order and forced to invite in as much French capital as possible. Whilst Miéville is 
right to stress that imperialism can articulate itself ‘in the recognition of formally independent 
postcolonial states', in Haiti’s case this imperialism of recognition was articulated through 
racialised categories.  
 
 
The US Occupation 
 
Even after France recognised Haiti’s independence, the US continued to refuse to do so. 
Despite the Monroe Doctrine, Haiti’s status as a black republic meant that throughout the 
1800s, such recognition was not forthcoming.237 It was only in 1862, with the secession of the 
South, that the US government finally recognised Haiti’s independence, in part because it 
believed that Haiti could serve as a bulwark against the Spanish-controlled Dominican 
Republic. This signalled the beginning of open US interest in Haiti. 
 
The Haitian state was increasingly burdened by debt. Although Haiti had paid off the initial 
indemnity, in 1883 it had been forced to take out further loans to stave off default. In 1909, 
the Haitian National Bank had been bought out by two US banks, with US capital 
increasingly penetrating Haiti’s economy.238 Yet US capital did not bring relief. By 
transforming the Haitian countryside and disrupting peasant agriculture, it created greater 
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levels of social and political instability. This instability was amplified by the poor economic 
situation brought about the necessity of constantly paying off debt. 
 
Haiti’s situation was dire, and US policymakers feared Haiti might default on its debts. 
Haitians, the US argued, lacked the ability to engage in effective self-governance and needed 
tutelage from the United States.239 Indeed, Woodrow Wilson, in a 1914 speech to the 
Associated Press, declared that the US had been ‘obliged by circumstances’ to shoulder the 
burden of trusteeship for Latin America.240 Consequently, Wilson’s approach to Haiti, and 
other nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, prefigured his later advocacy of the 
League of Nations Mandate System. At the same time, it precisely echoed those same 
racialised assumptions deployed by the Spanish in their initial occupation of Hispaniola.  
 
All of this came to a head in 1915, when President Vilbrun Sam was killed. In the aftermath, 
the US deployed its marines in Haiti for ‘preservation of order and the protection of the 
legations’.241 The intervention and subsequent occupation were justified under three 
international legal arguments: ‘first, preservation of national order; second, protection of US 
diplomatic and economic legations, foreign capital and property; third, infringement of the 
Monroe Doctrine because of French “intervention”’.242 The legal justifications were 
explicitly undergirded with racialised notions of trusteeship. For example, Philip Marshall 
Brown—then Associate Editor of the American Journal of International Law—argued, 
somewhat paradoxically, that the occupation guarded ‘against the cession of territory by Haiti 
to any foreign government, or the impairment of its independence’.243 As ‘a responsible 
member of the family of nations’, he stated, the US had to act ‘as an elder brother’.244 
Elsewhere Brown argued that too strict a reading of the prohibition on intervention in relation 
to Haiti ignored the fact that ‘[c]ertain peoples in a retarded stage of political development 
cannot reasonably be held to rigid interpretations of . . . international law’ and that it was up 
to the US to help Haiti fulfil its legal obligations.245 
 
The first act of the occupation was to ensure its candidate (Philippe Dartiguenave) won in 
new elections. Upon victory, he signed the ominously titled ‘Treaty Between Haiti and the 
United States Regarding the Finances, Economic Development and Tranquillity of Haiti’, 
which put the occupation on a firmer international legal basis.246 Under Article II a ‘General 
Receiver’ (nominated by the US) would be appointed who, under Article IV would ‘collate, 
classify, arrange and make full statement of all the debts of the Republic’ and report monthly 
to both the Haitian and US governments (Article VII). This General Receiver took control of 
all customs revenues (Article III) and was mandated to use those revenues to (in order of 
priority): pay the salaries of those employed by the Receivership; service Haiti’s debt; and 
maintain the constabulary. To these concerns with debt were also added concerns with 
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security: the Haitian government committed never to cede any land to a foreign power 
(Article XI) and was instructed to establish a constabulary ‘organized and officered by 
Americans, appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the 
United States’ (Article X). In effect, ‘the United States was to take control of Haitian customs 
houses and the state treasury’.247 
 
When opposition to the treaty began to arise the US declared martial law, proclaiming the 
need to ‘preserve fundamental human rights’. Anti-US newspapers were shut down and ‘false 
propaganda’ was banned. The US controlled treasury refused to pay officials until the 
agreement was signed. Under intense pressure, the Haitian Senate ratified the agreement.248 
In this way, the Haitian populace was deemed as (racially) unfit to manage their own affairs. 
This set the space for an intervention explicitly designed to reshape the Haitian economy 
under the rubric of promoting ‘good government’ in Haiti.249 The occupation achieved these 
objectives with aplomb, US capital flooded into Haiti, building railroads and re-establishing 
agricultural monoculture.250 At the same time, US military dominance in Haiti was achieved 
by the creation of the Gendarmerie, a Haitian military and police force which was ‘officered 
by marines and molded in the image of the Marine Corps’.251 
 
However, the Haitian Constitution still stood in the way of full social and economic 
transformation. The anti-colonialism of the Haitian Revolution was embedded in a 
constitutional clause which forbade foreign ownership. Any removal of this clause was 
strongly resisted by the Haitian opposition. In response, the US military dissolved the 
Assembly at gunpoint, and put the new constitution to a highly dubious referendum, which 
duly passed.252 Under this new regime, the role of foreign capital grew apace, particularly in 
the sectors of sugar and banana cultivation. In order to contain resistance to the occupation, 
the US imported its Jim Crow laws of racial segregation into the occupation.253 Once again, a 
legally sanctioned regime of racial hierarchy was employed to manage the Haitian populace, 
in which all Haitians were coded as ‘black’ and therefore inferior.254 Any resistance was dealt 
with harshly by the Gendarmerie, which was justified by the supposed savagery of the 
Haitian populace.255 
 
Even after Haiti was recognised as a sovereign state, therefore, it suffered from the legacy of 
the formalised racism of the slave trade. This came in the form of debt, which had integrated 
Haiti into a cycle of debt dependency which drew the Haitian state closer to France and later 
the US, leading to further levels of political and economic instability. This instability then 
combined with racialised ideas about the uncivilised and incompetent nature of Haiti, which 
enabled US military intervention, which itself opened Haiti up for further rounds of capital 
accumulation.  
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Racialised interventions 
 
The US only left Haiti in 1934. The lopsided focus of Haitian development on primary 
commodities, as well as continued debt dependence, meant that Haiti suffered heavily in the 
Great Depression.256 In the following years, Haiti was marked by constant political turmoil 
until the 1957 election of François Duvalier, who imposed a brutal regime. Duvalier was 
initially opposed by the US, but found favour as a bulwark against ‘communism’. He was 
succeeded by his son, who continued to rule until he was ousted by a popular uprising in 
1986. 
 
The US occupation and its aftermath set the pattern for Haiti’s future. Whilst the more overt 
racism of the period could no longer operate, a tight nexus of racialised stereotypes and debt-
dependency continued allow global capital into Haiti. This is particularly evident in the role 
that international financial institutions (IFIs) have played in Haiti following the end of the 
Duvalier dictatorships. During the 1980s, Haiti’s main economic strength—exports in 
agricultural commodities—had fallen. Haiti lacked the productive advancements necessary to 
compete on the global scale, as competitors flooded the market and depressed global 
prices.257 This left Haiti in a perilous economic state, requiring the help of IFIs. 
 
The IFIs—deploying the same explanations they had applied to Africa—attributed Haiti’s 
lack of competitiveness to currency problems and a lack of openness to trade. They believed 
Haiti could ‘export their way out of poverty by specializing in primary commodity 
production, which was supposedly their area of comparative advantage’.258 Haiti was forced 
to float its currency on the market, leading to a plunge in the value of the Haitian gourde 
causing massive inflation. Since wages had stagnated, this led to a massive decline in the real 
wages of Haitian workers.  
 
The IMF also made Haiti ‘open its market by adopting some of the lowest tariff regimes in 
the Caribbean’.259 This led to a flood of imports of heavily-subsidised US rice, Similarly, US 
chicken exports ‘destroyed the traditional Haitian poultry industry’.260 Haiti’s free-range 
reared chickens could not compete in price or speed with the US’ industrially produced ones. 
At the same time, Haiti’s lack of productive advancements, as well as a lack of global 
demand, meant that farmers were not able to simply switch to new cash crops. All of this was 
coupled with a huge fall in customs duties, which had historically been a primary source of 
revenue for the Haitian state.261 By pushing down wages, these interventions created a labour 
force suited for the labour intensive textile market. But these industries, of necessity, must 
keep down their wages. Moreover they are either directly owned by capitalists from advanced 
states, or are tightly integrated into their supply chains. Consequently all profits flowed out of 
Haiti.  
 
However, the IFIs are incapable of admitting that Haiti’s problems might be caused by the 
institutions themselves, let alone the global economy.262 Instead, in the words of a 2002 
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World Bank report, ‘poor governance’ ‘is the greatest impediment to effective development 
assistance in Haiti’ and ‘a major determinant of Haiti’s high poverty levels’.263 The report 
continues that the ‘government was overwhelmed by the diverse, complex procedures of 
donors’.264 These ‘human resource constraints’ allow ‘opportunities for corruption’.265 Here, 
the Bank relies on a language that is highly reminiscent of the US in its occupation, stressing 
the inability of Haitians to self-govern and understand the complexities of modern life. This 
racialised language was crucial in enabling international control over Haiti’s economy, 
opening it up further to global capital.  
 
Haiti’s history thus perfectly captures the close relationship between racialisation, capital 
accumulation and the law. At every stage of Haiti’s relationship with global capitalism, the 
law racialised it in particular roles, with these roles changing in step with the patterns of 
global accumulation. Spanish jurists justified practices of primitive accumulation through 
racialising the natives of Ayti, and positing Spanish civilisation as inherently superior. The 
limits of this model—which lay in the inability to fully exploit the natives—were solved 
through articulating a racialised hierarchy through the law, in which the black slave could be 
worked as hard as necessary. This became the foundation of French prosperity in Saint-
Domingue.  
 
When Haiti managed to overturn this hierarchy, it remained fundamentally isolated on the 
world stage, since all of the major capitalist powers owed their economic position to 
racialised slave labour. When Haiti was finally recognised by France, compensation for the 
racialised slave trade tied Haiti further to processes of capitalist accumulation. Race 
continued to structure the relationship of global capital to independent Haiti. The legal 
justifications for the 1915 US invasion—which opened Haiti up to US capital—were 
undergirded by racialised notions of trusteeship, and Haiti’s inability to self-govern. When 
resistance to these processes flared up, it was managed through the imposition of racial 
hierarchies—as with the Code Noir and Jim Crow Laws—or delegitimised through the use of 
racial stereotypes about violence and instability. In the modern era, this racism has assumed 
more ‘cultivated’ forms, but the IFIs continue to rely on those same racialised assumptions 
about Haitian incompetence and corruption to legitimate keeping Haiti open to global capital.  
 
In this way, the 2004 intervention is a perfect re-capitulation of Haiti’s preceding history. 
Haiti’s transformation into a low wage, textile-driven economy was achieved by mobilising 
racialised stereotypes about laziness and corruption. Just as in 1915, the influx of foreign 
capital contributed massively to political instability. When the UN stepped in, it reproduced, 
almost completely, the language of the US in its 1915 intervention—appealing to Haitians’ 
inability to self-govern and the need to restore ‘law and order’. Any resistance was 
delegitimised by deploying racialised stereotypes. Profit maximisation was underscored and 
undergirded by racialisation. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
263 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, ‘Haiti: Country Assistance Evaluation’, Report No. 23637, 
12 February 2002, available at http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/haiti_cae.pdf (last visited 8 January 2016) 
4. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid 21. 
Full version available (2016) 4 London Review of International Law, 81-126 
34 
 
In 1966, the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
better known as the Tricontinental, was held in Havana. Bringing together radical Third 
World governments, national liberation movements and assorted revolutionaries, the 
Tricontinental represented ‘a radical anti-imperialism located firmly in the socialist camp’.266 
On a 1965 visit, its chief organiser, the Moroccan revolutionary Mehdi Ben Barka—who was 
murdered later that year—declared that the conference aimed to ‘blend the two great currents 
of world revolution: that which was born in 1917 with the Russian Revolution, and that 
which represents the anti-imperialist and national liberation movements of today’.267  
 
This article has attempted to reproduce this spirit in international law. It has argued that 
separating out ‘value’ and ‘race’ when understanding the relationship between international 
law and imperialism is unsustainable. Instead it has attempted to draw on radical Third World 
Marxist traditions to articulate a ‘stretched Marxism’, in which processes of racialisation are 
understood as part and parcel of the logic of capital accumulation. It has illustrated this by 
charting the complex inter-relationships between value, race and law that played out over 
Haiti’s history. By drawing on the common ancestry between those scholars influenced by 
the Marxist tradition, and those who draw inspiration from postcolonialism, it is hoped that 
stretched Marxism can contribute to a wider conversation between the two most important 
currents in contemporary debates about imperialism and international law.  
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